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Abstract:
The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) marks an important political 
moment when European integration has been extended to the issue of defence. 
Understandably, there has been extensive commentary on the ESDP, most of which has 
focused on the ESDP’s institutional, industrial or military deficiencies. These 
commentaries have been illuminating but by concentrating on the manifest weaknesses 
of the ESDP, scholars have perhaps neglected to discuss explicitly how a coherent 
ESDP could develop. Drawing on recent work by Ben Tonra, this paper discusses the 
social conditions which are likely to be necessary if the ESDP is to develop into a 
robust policy. Above all else, a coherent ESDP depends upon the development of a 
binding sense of mutual obligation between France, Germany and Britain. These 
nations need to commit themselves to collective defence goals. The paper goes on to 
argue that for this collective commitment to be developed between these nations, the 
ESDP requires missions. Only through missions, in which these nations together 
experience a shared threat, will enduring shared interests and the collective will to 
address them be developed. The future of the ESDP will thus be finally determined by 
the actions which are carried out in its name. In the end, this may mean that a European 
defence identity develops not through an independent ESDP but through NATO.
Introduction
1
The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was developed as the second, 
intergovernmental pillar of the Treaty of European Union, signed at Maastricht in 
December 1991. However, the decisive moment for the development of the CFSP 
occurred when Britain finally committed itself to a common European defence policy. 
In 1998, Tony Blair announced his intention to contribute to the development of CFSP 
at Portschach and in December, at St Malo, the French and British governments 
formally tied themselves to co-operative military action.1 As a result of this 
announcement, the European Defence and Security Policy (ESDP) was developed as a 
specific programme within the CFSP and was ratified at the Treaty of Nice in 2000. The 
European Defence and Security Policy denoted a quite dramatic shift in European 
defence orientation. It committed the Union to the ‘Headline Goal’ of a European Rapid 
Reaction Force by 2003.2 This would consist of a force of 60,000 troops, deployable 
anywhere within the world within 60 days, capable of fulfilling the Petersberg tasks and 
sustainable for a year.3 The ESDP has effectively created a European Defence 
Community for the first time, some fifty years after the initial efforts to create a union 
foundered. Given the potential political importance of the ESDP, there has been 
understandably extensive discussion about it in the academic literature. Commentators 
have focused on the implications of the ESDP for transatlantic relations4, the 
development of an industrial policy in relation to it5, its military and political 
deficiencies6 and its institutional structure.7 The problem is that although it is implicit in 
their discussions, few commentators describe explicitly how the ESDP can be 
developed into a coherent and robust policy. Commentators not unreasonably focus on 
the weaknesses of the ESDP rather than it possible future. 
In a recent paper about the CFSP, however, Tonra has illustrated at a theoretical 
level how the ESDP might develop. Drawing on sociology, Tonra rejects the notion that 
humans interact on the basis of rational self-interest, seeking in every instance to 
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maximise their individual preferences. In fact, in the course of interaction, humans form 
social groups. As members of these social groups, humans are together able to produce 
collective goods which are not available to them as individuals. So indispensable are 
these collective goods that humans typically prioritise group interests and goals above 
their own private self-interests. The benefits of collective goods are a powerful 
incentive for co-operating with others rather than pursuing a self-interested course of 
action. However, the group also has a sanction to ensure that group members contribute 
and do not merely free-ride on others. The group can exclude those who are regarded as 
non-contributors from the collective benefits of membership. Given the importance of 
collective goods to human existence, the threat of exclusion is an effective means of 
enjoining members prioritise collective interests and contribute to the group. Tonra’s 
work on the CFSP applies this sociological insight to the processes of European 
integration. He highlights the way that the intergovernmental bargaining process 
transforms the perceptions and understandings of those politicians involved in it. ‘The 
creation of this common information pool and language contributes crucially to the 
identity change in national foreign policies as a result of their participation in EPC or 
CFSP’.8 Tonra notes that in Denmark and Ireland, the CFSP placed core foreign policy 
interests under pressure and contributed to their redefinition.9  Self-interested national 
bargaining was transformed into collective action.10 As they became active members of 
the CFSP, Ireland and Denmark oriented themselves to the needs of the group because 
the collective goods it offered were not available for these states when they acted 
independently. Significantly, the negative sanction of exclusion also operated on these 
members states. Denmark and Ireland committed themselves to these collective goods 
out of concern for their political standing with the European Union. If they rejected the 
CFSP outright refusing to contribute in any way to it, they would be excluded from its 
benefits and from other benefits of being part of the European Union. Member states, 
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aggrieved at their recalcitrance over the CFSP, might marginalise them from other 
group discussions and would limit their access to the collective goods which the 
European Union created for its members. In this way, Tonra illuminates the way 
member states commit themselves to collective goals and mutually compel each other 
to contribute to the collective good. Through interaction in policy discussion, European 
member states are able to establish certain common goals beneficial to all. Member 
states orient themselves mutually to these goals and are able to force each other to 
contribute to them with the threat of being excluded from the group and the benefits it 
offers. Only contributing group members can benefit from the collective goods which 
membership brings. Tonra applies the universal sociological process in which collective 
goods are produced and access to them restricted to contributing group members to the 
CFSP. 
Tonra’s sociological approach to the CFSP is illuminating and can be applied to 
the ESDP. The ESDP will be a meaningful policy only insofar as the member states 
collectively commit themselves to the stated shared goals. As Tonra noted of the CFSP, 
if the ESDP is to be a meaningful policy, the collective benefits of the ESPD must 
sufficiently attractive that member states are prepared alter their own individual goals 
and force structures to attain them. Member states will only change their individual 
policies, if they are dependent upon collective action for the delivery of critical security 
interests. Member states must feel themselves compelled to contribute to the ESDP 
because the collective security which it offers is vital to their interests. In this situation, 
the sanction of exclusion will also be a powerful motivation. States will seek the 
approbation of other group members and will want to avoid being shamed as non-
contributors since this will lead to marginalisation and exclusion from collective 
security goods.11 For a viable collective security policy to develop in Europe, the social 
process of group formation which Tonra describes must take place within the ESDP. 
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European member states need to recognise that security can be delivered only by co-
operative action and that exclusion from the collective project would be individually 
disastrous. If security can be delivered in another way so that there are no significant 
individual costs incurred for being outside the ESDP, this policy will be a dead letter.
A European Strategic Concept?
Although the ESDP is a European venture, many commentators emphasise the central 
dynamic in the development of European defence policy; the tri-lateral relationship 
between Britain, France and Germany. While smaller nations, such as Italy, Spain and 
Holland, have considerable armed forces, any feasible ESPD has finally to be built 
around Britain, France and Germany; this is the decisive European security triangle.12 
Thus, in considering the future of the ESDP, it is ultimately necessary to focus on 
whether these three major European powers can co-operate sufficiently closely to 
produce a distinctively European defence capability. In 1999, Germany, France and 
Britain held a trilateral meeting shortly before the 19 October European Council in 
Ghent and again in London on 4 November.13 Further summits were held in late 2001, 
in October 2003 and, most recently, a mini-summit (which wil be discussed in more 
detail below) was held in Berlin in February 2004.14 While the summits have offended 
the smaller excluded powers, they constituted important social processes when these 
three member states increasingly committed themselves to shared security interests. 
That commitment to shared interest is critical to transforming these member states from 
independent states into active members of a group, in the manner Tonra describes. 
Significantly, since the end of the Cold War but especially after the Kosovo crisis of 
1999, Britain, France and Germany have moved towards increasingly compatible 
strategic concepts; they are beginning to recognise important areas of shared security. 
All three nations recognised that territorial defence of Western Europe has been 
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superseded by the need to project power against the threat of terrorism and failing 
states. As Peter Struck, the current German minister of defence has noted: ‘The security 
of Germany is also defended in the Hindu Kush’.15 Recognising their collective 
interests, Germany, France and Britain have developed a broadly similar strategic 
concept. Indeed, this strategic convergence has been formally recognised by the 
European Union with the publication of the European Security Strategy.16 
Although Atlanticist, Britain has adopted a more European perspective since the 
late 1990s as the St Malo declaration decisively demonstrated. It is notable that in 
Bosnia, Britain opposed the United State’s lift and strike policy, while in Kosovo Tony 
Blair insisted that a ground option had to be available in order to make air-strikes 
credible.17 Britain’s strategic concept is moving closer to those of it European partners. 
Significantly, although France remains Europeanist, it too has begun to alter its strategic 
orientation. In the late 1990s, France finally reconciled itself with NATO’s command 
structure after a thirty year breach.18 Although this rapprochement stalled somewhat 
between 1999 and 2003, France has recently committed 1700 troops to the new NATO 
Response Force, in which senior French officers will have command positions.19 France 
no longer rejects NATO automatically as an example of US hegemony over Europe and 
is drawing together in a series of bilateral and multilateral military projects with Britain 
and Germany. As various commentators note, France is changing its traditionally 
unilateralist approach to defence, accepting that multinational deployments – 
unconscionable in the past – will become the norm in the future.20 Of the three major 
European member states, Germany’s strategic concept is changing the most.21 Although 
Germany is, like Britain, deeply committed to NATO and the United States, it 
increasingly recognises the growing relevance of a potentially independent European 
defence capability for global force projection. Germany’s special history now 
increasingly demand global interventions for the sake of peace and stability as 
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deployments during the Kosovo crisis in 1999 and again to Afghanistan in 2002 
demonstrated.22 Indeed, although Gerhard Schroeder insisted that under no 
circumstance would military deployment to Iraq be legitimate, Peter Struck, recently 
suggested at a NATO conference that it is not inconceivable that Germany might deploy 
troops to Iraq under a future UN mission.23 Germany, France and Britain still pursue 
their foreign, security and defence policies independently of each other and have 
significant interests which are not mutually shared, as the Iraq war demonstrated. 
Nevertheless, France, Germany and Britain are converging on a strategic consensus if 
not a precise strategic concept. As Tonra noted of the CFSP, as social interaction 
between these three powers increases, they are adapting their individual strategic 
concepts towards a more common, collective vision.
Common Force Structures
The ESDP was itself fundamentally a result of the failures of European defence 
capabilities in Bosnia and subsequently in Kosovo. Europe’s collective shortcomings 
has driven Germany, France and Britain together, forcing them to recognise their shared 
security and defence interests. From the 1990s, it became clear that no single European 
member state unilaterally possessed the necessary military forces to be politically 
effective at a global level. Thus, despite the difficulties of international co-operation on 
arms production and procurement as joint ventures like the A400M transport plane and 
the Eurofighter demonstrate, EU member states have begun to develop a common arms 
policy. EU States have committed themselves to the Organisation for Joint Armaments 
Cooperation (OCCAR) and signed the Letter of Intent signifying their intention to co-
operate further on arms development. Since the 1990s, there has been a conscious 
attempt to offset economic pressures and to produce interoperability which will 
improve Europe’s military capability. This constitutes the initial stage of group 
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formation which Tonra described. The critical question is whether Britain, France and 
Germany can create sufficiently dense social relations so that their collective interests 
converge further and they are mutually able to enjoin each other to address them. There 
is some evidence that these member states are beginning to orient themselves 
consciously to collective goals.
Significantly, there have been some important changes to European force, 
structures, especially in France and Germany. The performance of French troops in the 
Gulf – and the dismay which it evoked in the French military and in the government - 
led to the publication of the 1994 ‘Livre Blanc’ which outlined military reform.24 
Following this, Jacques Chirac announced in 1996 that the French military would be 
converted to an all-volunteer force by the 2002 and initiated the Military Planning Act 
as the legislative framework in which this transformation would take place. France’s 
Military Planning Act has sought to re-orient the French strategically and doctrinally. 
Significantly, Jacques Chirac has explicitly announced that the British armed forces are 
the model towards which France should strive.25 France is now deliberately imitating 
Britain so that it can contribute effectively to the ESDP.  France is recognising that 
collective security from which France will benefit individually will be assured only if it 
actively contributes to this emergent European axis. Moreover, France will only 
influence the direction of collective security policy by acting as a willing and 
constructive member of this group.26 It is in France’s individual national interest to 
reform itself in line with collective goals. By contributing to the emergence European 
defence axis, France can help establish a social group which can deliver a collective 
good – effective military capability – which is becoming impossible for France to 
guarantee for itself. As Tonra noted, because France is increasingly dependent on the 
collective security which the emergent military axis offers, it is willing to transform 
itself in line with the requirements of this group. France is actively reforming its force 
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structure in line with collective needs precisely because it cannot do without the 
collective good – security – which Europe offers. 
Following the Scharping reform programme, the Bundeswehr is undergoing 
similar changes. The recently down-sized 240,000-strong Bundeswehr is currently 
being divided into the three tiers consisting of a 35,000-strong reaction force, a 70,000 
stabilisation force and a 135,000 support force.27 This triadic force structure is a 
reformulation of the traditional Cold War Bundeswehr structure of an intervention 
force, a main defence force and a ‘basic military organisation’ dedicated to territorial 
defence in the face of a new strategic threats. Interestingly, Scharping’s reforms and the 
Weizsaecker and Kirchbach reports on which they were based stressed that the 
Bundeswehr need to be more ‘Bundnisfaehig’; the German armed forces had to be 
more capable of contributing to the multinational alliances of which they were part.28 
The Bundeswehr must become more interoperable with other nations. One of the 
driving forces behind the reform of the Bundeswehr has been the inability of Germany’ 
armed forces to sustain operational alliances with other key partners in NATO and in 
Europe. Germany can remain a respected and influential member of these international 
alliances only insofar as it transforms its Bundeswehr in line with collective needs. Like 
France, Germany’s internal reforms reflect the process which Tonra noted of Ireland 
and Denmark. The group of which Germany wishes to be a member is compelling 
Germany to transform itself so that it can contribute to collective goals if Germany 
wants to continue to receive the shared benefits of membership. Germany’s 
contributions to KFOR in Kosovo and to ISAF in Afghanistan demonstrate its 
increasing commitment to its European partners. It is interesting that Germany has also 
contributed to the NATO Response Force, demonstrating its commitment to the 
production of the highly mobile and deployable forces which will be essential to a 
robust ESDP. 
9
Missions29
In the light of strategic and economic changes, Britain, France and Germany have 
mutually influenced each other into altering their respective strategic concepts and force 
structures. The question is now whether this axis can be deepened and strengthened. 
There is an obvious route open to the three major powers here. Social groups are 
effective when their members contribute to the collective goals from which all 
subsequently benefit. Members are most likely to contribute fully to collective goals 
when the threat of exclusion from the group is likely to be catastrophic for the 
individual. Then individual and group interests are indistinguishable. Consequently, 
social groups tend to be most solidary when they come under serious external economic 
or political – and above all military – pressure. In the face of external aggression which 
may threaten the very existence of individual members, it will be in their immediate 
interests to contribute fully to the group. Exclusion – on the grounds that a member is 
not contributing sufficiently – would be disastrous in such a situation. Faced with this 
sanction, in almost every historical circumstance, group members have been willing to 
contribute to the group in order to enjoy the security which it offers as a collective 
benefit. It is noticeable that under the threat of the Axis Powers in the Second World 
War, the Allies collectively developed prodigious military capabilities extremely 
rapidly. The dynamics of group action suggest that the most effective way of creating a 
robust ESDP is for European member states – and above all the triple alliance of 
France, Germany and Britain – to conduct serious military missions together. On these 
missions, the collective interests of these states will be necessarily unified and these 
states and their militaries will be forced to contribute to collective goals if missions are 
not to fail with serious consequences for each state. The future of the ESDP lies, 
consequently, in its mission. 
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On 31 March 2003, the EU took over from NATO’s peace-keeping mission, 
Operation Allied Harmony, in FYROM. The EU mission Concordia, under French 
command, patrolled the ethnic Albanian-populated regions of Macedonia that border 
Albania, Serbia and Kosovo. The force, to which all EU Member States are contributing 
except Ireland and Denmark, consisted of 350 lightly armed military personnel with 
France as the lead nation. The mission drew on NATO assets under the Berlin-plus 
arrangement. The link with NATO was further emphasised by the structure of 
command. The headquarters was located at the Supreme Headquarter Allied Powers in 
Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium. Deputy SACEUR, Admiral Rainer Feist of the German 
navy was operation commander while French General Pierre Maral was force 
commander in theatre. In June 2003, the EU responded to a UN appeal for humanitarian 
assistance in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Under the ESDP, a force of 1800, 
mostly French, troops were deployed to the Congo on Operation Artemis to stabilise 
security conditions and assist in improving the humanitarian situation in Bunia, the 
capital of the Ituri region in the Congo where the problems were most serious. France 
was again the ‘framework’ nation; the force was under the command of Brigadier 
General Thonier and the headquarters was located in Paris. The French combat 
contingent was supported by small numbers of British and Swedish troops, while 
Belgium and Germany deployed non-combat personnel.30
The structure of these deployments is illuminating. They have been conducted 
from within NATO command structures, employing NATO assets. In the medium term 
future, any viable ESDP will have to operate within NATO because member states lack 
some of the critical physical and command assets for the deployment of troops. Without 
NATO, the ESDP would be unworkable. There is an important political dimension to 
the ESDP’s dependence on NATO. By operating within NATO and especially by 
drawing upon NATO’s command structure, the ESDP necessarily ties itself to the 
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United States. The Operation Commander of Concordia was the immediate subordinate 
of NATO’s always American Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The 
close professional relationship between these two commanders ensures that ESDP 
deployments are carried out under formal and informal American aegis. By drawing on 
NATO and by ‘double-hatting’ commanders and units, the ESDP ensures that the 
crucial political connection with the United States is maintained. In this way, the ESDP 
will avoid the de-coupling against which Madeleine Albright warned. Whatever 
reservations Europeans have about American unilateralism, the ESDP is viable 
politically and militarily only so long as a close relationship is maintained with 
America, minimally because it still relies of US assets. 
The Congo intervention, in particular, revealed another interesting prospect for 
the ESDP. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been extensive debate about NATO 
out-of-area deployment. Some commentators have dismissed the capability and the 
political will of the European Union to deploy to outside of traditional NATO areas: ‘It 
is clear, however, that ‘in-area’ does not include sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East or 
Central Asia. It is still difficult to see either NATO or the EU playing a significant role 
in organising collective military operations in these ‘out-of-area regions’.31 Yet, the 
Congo deployment demonstrates the ESDP’s ability to perform precisely these 
interventions. Moreover, unilateral interventions by France and Britain into the Ivory 
Coast and Sierra Leone have further demonstrated that there is significant political will 
for military interventions if historical precedent and political circumstances demand it.32 
In the case of both these deployments, British and French troops were engaged in 
combat missions, suppressing rebel groups. In both cases, casualties were taken. These 
African operations demonstrate that there are sufficient national interests to promote 
military intervention on a global scale in France and Britain. The question is whether 
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these national security interests can become collective European interests to which 
member states are willing to contribute. 
The Artemis and Concordia missions are important demonstrations that 
collective interests – and the commitment to act upon them – are beginning to appear. 
The problem with current ESDP operations is that they are so small. In military terms, 
Operations Concordia and Artemis are miniscule. For collective European interests to 
develop further, European member states – and above all Britain, France and Germany 
– must conduct more and bigger missions with each other. Significantly, in 2004 the EU 
has some 30,000 soldiers in Bosnia and a further 7000 in Afghanistan, commanded by a 
German general in Kabul.33 These forces effectively represent ‘coalitions of the willing’ 
but it may be precisely out of these ad hoc forces that a coherent defence axis emerges 
in Europe. These missions constitute an important realisation of common European 
defence interests, even if they are not formally part of the ESDP. In 2005, the European 
Union is taking over responsibility for Bosnia-Herzogovnia from NATO. This is 
without question the EU’s most serious deployment up to date and is likely to be critical 
to the future of the ESDP. For the first time, European member states will be operating 
autonomously in a strategically sensitive area. This mission will demand strategic 
coherence from European member states; each member state will have to contribute to 
the collective good if the mission is to work. In the end, national self-interest will be 
best served by contributing to this collective effort. The ESDP will develop as an 
effective policy only insofar as European member states commit themselves to these 
missions where their collective interests are realised in a concrete fashion. 
The NATO Response Force
The ESDP will require missions if it is to develop into a serious policy. However, if 
missions are crucial to the development of collective interests and commitments, this 
13
suggests that the future of European security may not finally take the course of an 
independent ESDP. On the contrary, its future may lie in a reformed NATO. 
Significantly, the European members of NATO already share over fifty years of joint 
history and the experience of the same threat. This means that not only have they 
developed shared standard operating procedures but that they have established the 
dense social commitment to one another through this alliance. Under Article 5, the 
members of the Alliance have been formally committed to each others’ common 
defence. More recently, French, German and British troops have worked closely as part 
of the NATO KFOR in Kosovo and ISAF in Afghanistan. Moreover, Operations 
Artemis and Concordia were dependent on NATO assets and the infrastructure for the 
EU’s mission to Bosnia-Herzgovenia is a product of NATO’s ten-year deployment in 
the country and will draw on some NATO assets under the Berlin-plus agreement. If 
restructured appropriately NATO could become the viable institutional framework and 
military capability of the ESDP.
The current transformation of NATO structures may promote the use of the 
Atlantic Alliance as a basis of the ESDP. Over the last ten years, NATO has developed 
flexible rapid reaction forces34 and, in specific response to the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, the formation of a NATO Response Force was announced at the Prague 
Summit in November 2002.35 There, the 19 existing members of NATO voted 
unanimously to modernise the alliance so it can confront threats from international 
terrorism, hostile dictatorial regimes and rogue states. The NATO Response Force will 
consist of joint air, maritime and ground forces deployable within 5 to 30 days to 
international trouble spots and remain operational for up to three months if required. It 
will be based on a brigade of 3 to 5 mobile ground battalions including logistic support 
supported by 3 to 5 fighter squadrons, 7 to 15 naval combatants.36 It will be commanded 
by senior general under SACEUR. The Land Component Command (LCC) element – 
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the brigade on which it is based - will draw on six existing high-readiness NATO 
headquarters; Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (Rheindalen), the 
Eurocorps (Strasbourg), the German-Netherlands Corps (Munster), NATO’s Rapid 
Deployable Corps-Turkey (NRDC) (Istanbul), NRDC-Spain (Valencia) and NRDC-
Italy (Milan). LCC will be rotated on a six-monthly basis around these six formations.37 
The NRF will undergo specialised training to ensure they are capable of fighting 
together effectively on short notice under the command of a Combined Joint Task Force 
Headquarters.38 The NRF was inaugurated on 15 October 2003 and it conducted an 
initial demonstration exercise (Exercise Allied Response) in Turkey in November of that 
year.39 In October 2004, an operational capability exercise (Operation Destined Glory) 
took place in Sardinia.40 The first full exercises of the NRF are scheduled for 2005 and 
the force should be fully operational with 21,000 troops by 2006.41 
Significantly, among both European military and political leaders, there is an 
increasing consensus that Europe will require a more robust interventionist force than 
the Headline Goal provides. General Klaus Naumann, the former Deputy SACEUR, has 
emphasised this point, claiming that Europe should not be satisfied merely with 
‘clearing up work’ (Aufraumenarbeit).42 For him, Europe must develop their defence 
capabilities so that they are a credible military force actor in global politics.43 For 
Naumann, the EU needs to transcend merely Petersberg tasks. Reflecting Naumann’s 
concerns, in February 2004, following a mini-summit, France, Germany and Britain 
proposed a ‘battle-group’ concept which was approved by the EU in April. Instead of 
the Headline Goal of 60,000 troops restricted to Petersberg tasks, the three premiers 
sought to create a strategic concept which would be better adapted to the post 9/11 
context. They emphasised that Europe needed a more responsive and flexible military, 
capable to deploying to a number of concurrent contingencies. The proposed battle-
groups based on battalion units would consist of about 1500 troops including 
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supporting elements and should be ready for deployment within 15 days. The aim is to 
create two to three high readiness battle groups by 2005 and up to nine by 2007.44 The 
battle-groups will to be more robust than the Headline Goal.
The emergence of the battle-group concept is an important moment for the 
ESDP. It demonstrates a thickening of strategic coherence between Britain, France and 
Germany but it also suggests that the ultimate form which the emergent alliance might 
take. The battle-group concept represents a convergence of NATO and ESDP strategic 
concepts. With the battle-group concept and the NRF, both the ESDP and NATO are 
now committed to the creation of smaller, more flexible and more deployable joint 
forces. However, if the battle-group concept is the future of the ESDP, then the NRF 
seems to be the most effective vehicle for delivering this capability. The units which the 
ESDP will deploy as its battle-groups will be those deployable, light units already ear-
marked for the NRF. Since they will draw on NATO assets when deploying as part of 
the ESDP, the distinction between an ESDP and a NATO deployment will become 
operationally irrelevant. Moreover, in actuality, the NRF is likely to provide more 
robust and more rapidly deployable forces. The spearhead units of the NRF will be on 5 
days notice to move. In comparison, the ESDP’s proposed battle-groups cannot 
ultimately be described as genuinely rapid reaction forces as they will take over two 
weeks to deploy. In addition, it is questionable how effective a force of 1500 could be in 
military terms. Certainly, the missions which such a force could perform would be 
minor – like Artemis and Concordia. The brigade-size force of the NRF would provide 
a far more potent and flexible military option. While the NRF could be deployed for 
larger missions, it could easily be task-organised for smaller deployments. Moreover, 
NATO consciously recognises that future contingencies will be met by coalitions of the 
willing and, as SACEUR General James Jones has emphasised, the NRF has been 
structured in a flexible way to facilitate the deployment and inter-operability of ad hoc 
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multinational forces.45 The NRF is intended to be a forum which will facilitate future 
coalitions of the willing. The ESDP’s battle-groups by contrast are based on 
autonomous national battalions; they cannot act as the vehicle for either formal or ad 
hoc multinational coalitions. Military practicalities are likely to favour the deployment 
of the NRF in the face of crisis rather than the ESDP’s battle-groups. Although Tony 
Blair’s comments about the need for a European reaction force capable of deployment 
to Africa in Ocotber 2004 may have been designed primarily to appease African 
leaders, it was notable that he announced that this force should be 15,000 strong; that is, 
approximately the projected size of the NRF rather than the ESDP’s 60,000 Headline 
Goal or the proposed 1500-strong European battlegroups.46 Blair’s comments cannot be 
taken as a definitive statement of policy but they do suggest that for practical military 
reasons, the future of the ESDP may be in NATO. 
There are several political transformations which suggest that in the future of 
NATO and the NRF, in particular, will subsume the ESDP. In 2004, the European Union 
expanded to include 10 new member states from central Europe. Three of these new 
member states (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) entered NATO in 1999 while 
the rest joined in 2004. The reformed NATO has advantages over the ESDP in 
mobilising the military forces of new member states like Poland. The ESDP has 
insufficient institutional structures to conduct more than minor operations. Even with 
the recent reforms to NATO which allows the ESDP to draw on some of its planning 
and command cells, the European Union Military Committee and its advisory body the 
European Union Military Staff is not capable of operational planning and command on 
any serious scale.47 In practical terms, it would be extremely difficult for the ESDP to 
co-ordinate a multinational coalition of any size. The ESDP also lacks independent 
unified doctrine and standard operating procedures. By contrast, NATO has a robust 
institutional framework, consolidated over fifty years, with a coherent doctrine and 
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standard operational procedures. NATO cannot ensure that European member states 
will act in defence of their collective interests but it is institutionally more able to co-
ordinate their armed forces should they choose to do so than the ESDP as it is currently 
constituted.
In the late 1990s, Turkey’s exclusion from the EU created very severe political 
problems about the use of NATO-assets. Partly in response to its exclusion from the 
EU, Turkey opposed the Berlin-plus arrangements whereby Western European members 
might draw on shared assets to conduct missions, which might not be in Turkey’s 
interests. Indeed, Albright’s concerns about the ESDP’s discrimination against non-EU 
member states referred specifically to the problems created by Turkish objections. 
However, if the proposed accession of Turkey into the EU, by perhaps 2010, occurs, the 
contradiction between NATO and the ESDP may be substantially resolved. At that 
point, it is likely that all EU member states would also be members of NATO.48 In this 
situation where NATO and the EU overlapped so closely, there would be little political 
role for an independent ESDP outside of NATO. Whatever policy the EU decided to 
follow would overlap with the policy of European NATO countries and certainly the 
policy of politically and militarily significant NATO nations. NATO may become the de 
facto defence institution of the EU and the military means by which the ESDP is 
prosecuted. 
There are further political developments which promote NATO as the most 
likely vehicle for European defence in the future. Various commentators have noted that 
while America stress the NATO connection as a means of retaining political control 
over Europe, the United States is in a de facto process of withdrawal from NATO; it no 
longer sees the alliance as relevant or useable.49 Thus, while the evocation of Article 5 
was appreciated as an expression of political solidarity after 11 September attacks, the 
United States did not even consider drawing on NATO in the subsequent Afghan and 
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Iraqi campaigns. While NATO remains very important to Europe as a means of 
sustaining international alliances with each other – and of engaging the United States 
politically – it is increasingly irrelevant to the United States. Given the slow military, if 
not political, disengagement of the United States, NATO could become a primarily 
European organisation, connected politically and supported militarily by the United 
States. NATO could organically develop into the institutional and military basis of the 
ESDP. The re-integration of France into NATO command structures and the entry of ten 
central European countries into the alliance have weighted the alliance further towards 
Europe.50 It is noticeable that the NRF itself denotes the growth of an increasingly 
autonomous European pillar within NATO. The NRF consists of only 300 American 
personnel and, although the force is under the nominal command of SACEUR, it will, 
in fact, be commanded by a European general. The withdrawal of the United States 
from NATO is likely to continue in the future, matched by a concomitant 
Europeanisation of the Alliance.
There are other processes which are promoting further Europeanisation of the 
Alliance. Britain’s decision to go to war in Iraq with the United States was in line with 
its traditionally Atlanticist position but it threatened to undermine the ESDP. Indeed, the 
Iraq War seemed to demonstrate the political impracticality of any serious European 
defence co-operation.51 The collective security interests of the EU are negligible. The 
ultimate result of this intervention may, ironically, be quite the reverse. As Britain 
becomes embroiled in an increasingly unpopular civil war in Iraq which may ultimately 
cost Tony Blair his premiership, the Iraq intervention may not vindicate Britain’s 
special relationship with America but mark its culminating point. The Iraq intervention 
may demonstrate that Britain’s interests no longer lie in so close a relationship with a 
United States which is becoming so unilateral that even its closest ally, Britain, cannot 
influence its foreign policy in any serious way. Rather, out of the current difficulties of 
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Iraq, an increasingly Europeanist consensus may emerge in Britain. Britain is likely to 
promote an increasingly effective European pillar within NATO and to become less 
resolutely Atlanticist. Over the next decade, NATO’s centre of gravity is likely to shift 
eastwards from the Atlantic to Continental Europe and to the emergent British-French-
German axis. In the light of the unilateralism of the United States and the new strategic 
threats which Europe faces, the national interests of Britain, France and Germany may 
be converging into a genuinely collective interest to which each nation will need to 
contribute. The future of the ESDP, the means by which this axis addresses their 
collective security interests, may lie with a reformed NATO.
Conclusion
Military alliances – for whatever purpose – are effective only when the members of 
these coalitions commit themselves to common goals. The behaviour of group members 
must be influenced by their membership of the group so that they prioritise collective 
goals above individual rewards. The very fact that there is an ESDP at all signifies that 
the major European member states are beginning to recognise certain shared interests 
and to act upon them; they are recognising their common strategic interests, deliberately 
re-forming their force structures and looking to co-operate with each other militarily. 
Yet, ultimately, a meaningful defence community will come into being only so long as 
the European Union faces a shared threat of sufficient magnitude that collective action 
becomes essential and exclusion from this project is potentially disastrous. A viable 
ESDP requires missions which unify military professionals and consolidate collective 
interests in a way which mere statements of policy never can. However, if missions are 
critical to the formation of a European defence identity, there may be an easier way of 
promoting these European interests than by attempting to build a new alliance from the 
ground up. It is likely that European member states – especially since these now 
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involve 10 new members from central Europe – will find that NATO provides a more 
robust institutional setting for them to develop a collective response to shared threats. 
However, whether NATO or an autonomous institutional complex becomes the basis of 
European security, missions will be essential. The core European nations must be 
mutually committed to prosecute their colective interests if there is to be anything 
which might be termed collective security. Consequently, these nations must go on 
military missions together, through which they can develop a collective commitment to 
shared goals. Specifically, Britain, France and Germany must engage in multinational 
ventures with each other so that their interests do increasingly cohere. Without these 
missions, without the demonstration that these three countries have shared security 
interests and collective will to prosecute them, the ESDP will remain merely 
hypothetical. Europe will have no collective security interests but only the diverse 
interests and military capabilities of its member states. 
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